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ABSTRACT
Protecting the privacy of search engine users is an important require-
ment in many information retrieval scenarios. A user might not want
a search engine to guess his or her information need despite request-
ing relevant results. We propose a method to protect the privacy of
search engine users by decomposing the queries using semantically
related and unrelated distractor terms. Instead of a single query, the
search engine receives multiple decomposed query terms. Next, we
reconstruct the search results relevant to the original query term by
aggregating the search results retrieved for the decomposed query
terms. We show that the word embeddings learnt using a distributed
representation learning method can be used to find semantically re-
lated and distractor query terms. We derive the relationship between
the anonymity achieved through the proposed query anonymisation
method and the reconstructability of the original search results using
the decomposed queries. We analytically study the risk of discover-
ing the search engine users’ information intents under the proposed
query anonymisation method, and empirically evaluate its robustness
against clustering-based attacks. Our experimental results show that
the proposed method can accurately reconstruct the search results
for user queries, without compromising the privacy of the search
engine users.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Information retrieval systems have become essential tools in our day-
to-day activities. We constantly search information on the Web using
search engines by issuing keywords that describe our information
needs. However, we might not always want the search engine to
discover our intent through the keywords we use in a search session.
For example, a patient with a particular disease might want to use a
web search engine to find information about his/her disease, but at
the same time might not want to disclose his/her health conditions.
As web search engine users, we are left with two options regard-
ing our privacy. First, we can trust the search engine not to disclose
the keywords that we use in a search session to third parties, or even
to use for any other purpose other than providing search results to
the users who issued the queries. However, the user agreements in
, ,
.
most web search engines do not allow such user rights. Although
search engines pledge to protect the privacy of their users by en-
crypting queries and search results1, the encryption is between the
user and the search engine – the original non-encrypted queries are
still available to the search engine. The keywords issued by the users
are a vital source of information for improving the relevancy of
the search engine and displaying relevant adverts to the users. For
example, in learning to rank [9], keywords issued by a user and the
documents clicked by that user are recorded by the search engine to
learn the optimal dynamic ranking of the search results. Query logs
have been used extensively to learn the user interests and extract
attributes related to frequently searched entities [19, 20, 24, 25, 27].
Considering the fact that placing advertisements for the highly bid
keywords is one of the main revenue sources for search engines,
there are obvious commercial motivations for the search engines to
exploit the user queries beyond simply providing relevant search
results to their users. For example, it has been reported that advertise-
ments contribute to 96% of Google’s revenue2. Therefore, it would
be unwise to assume that the user queries will not be exploited in a
manner unintended by the users
As an alternative approach that does not rely on the goodwill
of the search engine companies, we propose a method (shown in
Figure 1), where we disguise the queries that are sent to a search
engine such that it is difficult for the search engine to guess the real
information need of the user by looking at the keywords, yet it is
somehow possible for the users to reconstruct the search results
relevant for them from what is returned by the search engine. The
proposed method does not require any encryption or blindly trusting
the search engine companies or any third-party mediators. However,
this is a non-trivial task because a search engine must be able to
recognise the information need of a user in order to provide rele-
vant results in the first place. Therefore, query anonymisation and
relevance of search results are at a direct trade-off.
Specifically, given a user query A, our proposed method first finds
a set of n noisy relevant terms X1,X2, . . . ,Xn andm distractor terms
Y1,Y2, . . . ,Ym forA. We use pre-trained word embeddings for identi-
fying the noisy-relevant and distractor terms. We add Gaussian noise
to the relevant terms such that it becomes difficult for the search
engine to discoverA usingX1,X2, . . . ,Xn . However,X1,X2, . . . ,Xn
are derived using A, so there is a risk that the search engine will
perform some form of de-noising to unveil A from X1,X2, . . . ,Xn .
Therefore, usingX1,X2, . . . ,Xn alone as the keywords does not guar-
antee anonymity. To mitigate this risk, we generate a set of distractor
terms Y1,Y2, . . . ,Ym separately for each user query. We then issue
X1,X2, . . . ,Xn ,Y1,Y2, . . . ,Ym in random order to the search engine
1https://goo.gl/JSBvpK
2https://www.wordstream.com/articles/
google-earnings
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Figure 1: Overview of the proposed method. The original query
A is decomposed into a set of relevant (X ) and distractor (Y )
terms at the user-end. The search engine returns documents rel-
evant for both X and Y , denoted by D(X ) ∪D(Y ). We will ignore
D(Y ) and reconstruct the search results for A using D(X ).
to retrieve the corresponding search results. We then reconstruct the
search results for A using the search results we retrieve from the
noisy-relevant terms and discard the search results retrieved from
the distractor terms. It is noteworthy that during any stage of the
proposed method, we do not issue A as a standalone query nor in
conjunction with any other terms to the search engine. Moreover,
we do not require access to the search index, which is typically not
shared by the search engine companies with the outside world.
Our contributions in this paper can be summarised as follows:
• We propose a method to anonymise user queries sent to a
search engine by semantic decomposition to protect the pri-
vacy of the search engine users. Our proposed method uses
pretrained word embeddings.
• We introduce the concepts of anonymity (i.e., how difficult it
is to guess the original user query by looking at the auxiliary
queries sent to the search engine?), and reconstructability (i.e.
how easy it is to reconstruct the search results for the original
query from the search results for the auxiliary queries?), and
propose methods to estimate their values.
• We theoretically derive the relationship between anonymity
and reconstructability using known properties of distributed
word representations.
• We evaluate the robustness of the proposed query anonymisa-
tion method against clustering-based attacks, where a search
engine would cluster the keywords it receives within a single
session to filter our distractors and predict the original query
from the induced clusters. Our experimental results show
that by selecting appropriate distractor terms, it is possible to
guarantee query anonymity, while reconstructing the relevant
search results.
2 QUERY ANONYMISATION VIA SEMANTIC
DECOMPOSITION
2.1 Retrieval Model
Modern search engines use a complex retrieval mechanism that
involves search result ranking, sessions, personalisation, etc. More-
over, the exact implementations of those mechanisms differ from one
search engine to another and not publicly disclosed. Therefore, to
simplify the theoretical analysis and empirical validation, we resort
to a classical inverted index-based information retrieval, where we
return all documents that contain all words in the query, without
performing any relevance ranking.
2.2 Finding Noisy-Related Terms
Expanding a user query using related terms is a popular technique
in information retrieval [2], and is particularly useful when the
number of results for the original query is small or zero. For example,
consider the scenario that a user wants to obtain search results for
Bill Gates. In a typical search engine, we would search using the
query Bill Gates and retrieve documents that contain the phrase
Bill Gates. However, assuming that we did not find any documents
containing Bill Gates, we could automatically expand the original
query using its related terms to overcome the zero results problem.
For example, we could expand Bill Gates using the related term
Microsoft, which is a company founded by Bill Gates.
Although query expansion using related terms is motivated as
a technique for improving the recall in a search engine, we take a
different perspective in this paper – we consider query expansion
as a method for anonymising the search intent of a user. Numerous
methods have been proposed in prior work on query expansion to
find good candidate terms for expanding a given user query such
as using pre-compiled thesauri containing related terms and query
logs [2]. We note that any method that can find related terms for
a given user query A can be used for our purpose given that the
following requirements are satisfied:
(1) The user queryAmust never be sent to the search engine when
retrieving related terms for A because this would obviously
compromise the anonymisation goal.
(2) Repeated queries to the search engine must be minimised in
order to reduce the burden on the search engine. We assume
that the query anonymisation process to take place outside
of the search engine using a publicly available search API.
Although modern Web search engines would gracefully scale
with the number of users/queries, anonymisation methods
that send excessively large numbers of queries are likely to
be banned by the search engines because of the processing
overhead. Therefore, it is important that we limit the search
queries that we issue to the search engine when computing
the related terms.
(3) No information regarding the distribution of documents nor
the search index must be required by the related term identifi-
cation method. If we had access to the index of the search en-
gine, then we could easily find the terms that are co-occurring
with the user query, thereby identifying related terms. How-
ever, we assume that the query anonymisation process hap-
pens outside of the search engine. None of the major com-
mercial web search engines such as Google, Bing or Baidu
provide direct access to their search indices due to security
concerns. Therefore, it is realistic to assume that we will
not have access to the search index during anytime of the
anonymisation process, including the step where we find re-
lated terms to a given user query.
(4) The related terms must not be too similar to the original
user query A because that would enable the search engine to
guess A via the related terms it receives. For this purpose, we
would add noise to the user query A and find noisy related
neighbours that are less similar to A.
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We propose a method that use pre-trained word embeddings to
find related terms for a user query that satisfy all of the above-
mentioned requirements. Context-independent word embedding
methods such as word2vec [15] and GloVe [21] can represent the
meanings of words using low dimensional dense vectors. Using
word embeddings is also computationally attractive because they are
low dimensional (typically 100− 600 dimensions are sufficient), con-
suming less memory and faster when computing similarity scores.
Although we focus on single word queries for ease of discussion,
we note that by using context-sensitive phrase embeddings such
as Elmo [22] and BERT [5] we can obtain vectors representing
multi-word queries, which we defer to future work.
We denote the pretrained word embedding of a term A by v(A).
To perturbate word embeddings, we add a vector, θ ∈ Rd , sampled
independently for each A from the d-dimensional Gaussian with a
zero mean and a unit variance, and measure the cosine similarity
between v(A)+θ and each of the words Xi ∈ V in a predefined and
fixed vocabulary V, using their word embeddings v(Xi ). We then
select the top most similar words X1,X2, . . . ,Xn as the noisy related
terms of A.
Let us denote the set of documents retrieved using a query A by
D(A). If we use a sufficiently large number of related terms Xi to A,
we will be able to retrieve D(A) exactly using
D ′(A) =
n⋃
i=1
D(Xi ). (1)
However, in practice we are limited to using a truncated list of n re-
lated terms X1,X2, . . . ,Xn because of computational efficiency and
to limit the number of queries sent to the search engine. Therefore,
in practice D ′(A) will not be exactly equal to D(A). Nonetheless,
we assume the equality to hold in (1), and later analyse the approxi-
mation error. We do not consider the problem of ranking the search
results in this work, and focus only on reconstructing the set of
search results. If the number of relevant search result is large and
we would like to rank the most relevant search results at the top, we
can still use static or dynamic ranking information provided by the
search engine [9].
2.3 Anonymisation via Distractor Terms
Searching using noisy related terms Xi alone of a user query A,
does not guarantee the anonymity of the users. The probability of
predicting the original user query increases with the number of
related terms used. Therefore, we require further mechanisms to
ensure that it will be difficult for the search engine to predict A from
the queries it has seen. For this purpose, we select a set of unrelated
terms {Y1,Y2, . . . ,Ym }, which we refer to as the distractor terms.
Several techniques can be used to find the distractor terms for
a given query A. For example, we can randomly select terms from
the vocabulary V as the distractor terms. However, such randomly
selected distractor terms are unlikely to be coherent, and could be
easily singled-out from the related terms by the search engine. If we
know the semantic category of A (e.g. A is a person or a location
etc.), then we can limit the distractor terms to the same semantic
category as A. This will guarantee that both related terms as well as
distractor terms are semantically related in the sense that they both
represent the same category. Therefore, it will be difficult for the
Figure 2: Selecting distractor terms for a given queryA. We first
compute the noise (θ ) added vector A′ for A, and then search
for terms Yi that are located inside a cone that forms an angle ω
withA′. This would ensure that distractor terms are sufficiently
similar to the noise component, therefore difficult to distinguish
from A.
search engine to discriminate between related terms and distractor
terms. Information about the semantic categories of terms can be
obtained through different ways such as Wikipedia category pages,
taxonomies such as the WordNet [16] or by named entity recognition
(NER) tools.
We propose a method to find distractor terms Yi for each query
A using pretrained word embeddings as illustrated in Figure 2. Let
us consider a set of candidate terms C from which we must select
the distractor terms. For example, C could be a randomly selected
subset from the vocabulary of the corpus used to train word em-
beddings. First, we select a random hyperplane (represented by the
normal vector h ∈ Rd to the hyperplane) in the embedding space
that passes through the point corresponding to A. Next, we split
C into two mutually exclusive sets C+ = {x : x ∈ C,x⊤h ≥ 0}
and C− = {x : x ∈ C,x⊤h < 0} depending on which side of the
hyperplane the word is located. Let us define Cmax and Cmin to be
respectively the larger and smaller of the two sets C+ and C− (i.e.
Cmax = argmaxS∈{C+,C− } |C| and Cmin = argminS∈{C+,C− } |C|)
Next, we remove the top 10% of the similar words in Cmax to the orig-
inal query A. We then use this reduced Cmax as C (i.e. C ← Cmax)
and repeat this process until we are left with the desired number of
distractor terms in C. Intuitively, we are partitioning the candidate
set into two groups in each iteration considering some attribute (di-
mension) of the word embedding of the query (possibly representing
some latent meaning of the query), and removing similar terms in
that subspace.
2.4 Reconstructing Search Results
For a query, A, once we have identified a set of noisy related terms,
{X1,X2, . . . ,Xn }, and a set of distractor terms, {Y1,Y2, . . . ,Ym }, we
will issue those terms as queries to the search engine and retrieve
the relevant search results for each individual term. We issue related
terms and distractor terms in a random sequence, and ignore the
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results returned by the search engine for the distractor terms. Finally,
we can reconstruct the search results for A using (1).
3 ANONYMITY VS. RECONSTRUCTABILITY
Our proposed query decomposition method strikes a fine balance
between two factors (a) the difficulty for the search engine to guess
the original user query A, from the set of terms that it receives
Q(A) = {X1,X2, . . . ,Xn ,Y1,Y2, . . . ,Ym }, and (b) the difficulty to
reconstruct the search results, D(A), for the original user query, A,
using the search results for the noisy related terms following (1). We
refer to (a) as the anonymity, and (b) as the reconstructability of the
proposed query decomposition process.
3.1 Anonymity
We define anonymity, α , as the ease (or alternatively difficulty) to
guess the user query A, from the terms issued to the search engine
and compute it as follows:
α = 1 − 1|Q(A)|
∑
q∈Q(A)
sim(v(A),v(q)) (2)
Specifically, we measure the average cosine similarity between the
word embedding, v(A), for the original user query A, and the word
embeddings v(q) for each of q ∈ Q(A) search terms. If the similarity
is higher, then it becomes easier for the search engine to guessA from
the search terms. The difference between this average similarity and
1 (i.e. the maximum value for the average similarity) is considered
as a measure of anonymity we can guarantee through the proposed
query decomposition process.
3.2 Reconstructability
We reconstruct the search results forA using the search results for the
queries X1,X2, . . . ,Xn following (1). We define reconstructability,
ρ as a measure of the accuracy of this reconstruction process and is
defined as follows:
ρ =
|D(A) ∩ D ′(A)|
|D(A)| (3)
A document retrieved by only a single noisy related term might not
be relevant to the original user queryA. A more robust reconstruction
procedure would be to consider a document as relevant if it has been
retrieved by at least l different noisy related terms. If a user query A
can be represented by a set of documents where, each document is
retrieved by at least l < n different noisy related terms, then we sayA
to be l-reconstructable. In fact, the reconstruction process defined in
(1) corresponds to the special case where l = 1. Increasing the value
of l would decrease the number of relevant documents retrieved for
the original user query A, but it is likely to increase the relevance of
the retrieval process.
4 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANONYMITY
AND RECONSTRUCTABILITY
In this section, we derive the relationship between anonymity and
reconstructability. Because anonymity can be increased arbitrarily by
increasing the distractor terms, in this analysis, we ignore distractor
terms. This can be seen as a lower-bound for the anonymity that you
can obtain, without using any distractor terms. We first discuss the
case where we have only one related term (i.e. n = l = 1) and then
consider l > 1 reconstructability case.
4.1 n = l = 1 case
Let us consider the case where n = 1. Here, for a given query A, we
have only a single related term X = X1. In this case, l = 1, and we
consider all documents retrieved using X as relevant for A. We first
note that reconstructability, ρ, can be written as,
ρ =
|D(A) ∩ D ′(A)|
|D(A)| (4)
from the definition of reconstructability.
Because we have a single noisy related term X , we have D ′(A) =
D(X ). By substituting this in (4), we get
ρ =
|D(A) ∩ D(X )|
|D(A)| . (5)
If we consider the co-occurrence context of two terms to be
the document in which they co-occur, then (5) can be written as a
conditional probability given by (6).
ρ =
p(A,X )
p(A) = p(X |A) (6)
Theorem 2.2 in [1] provides a useful connection between the
probability of a word (or the joint probability of two words) and
their word representations, which we summarise below.
logp(A,X ) = | |v(A) +v(X )| |
2
2
2d − 2 logZ ± ϵ (7)
logp(A) = | |v(A)| |
2
2
2d − logZ ± ϵ (8)
Here, Z is the partition function and ϵ is the approximation error.
By taking the logarithm of both sides in (6) we obtain,
log ρ = logp(A,X ) − logp(A)
=
| |v(X )| |22 + 2v(X )⊤v(A)
2d − logZ (9)
Anonymity for a single query term X can be computed using
cosine similarity as follows:
α = 1 − v(A)
⊤v(X )
| |v(A)| |2 | |v(X )| |2
(10)
By substituting (10) in (9) we get,
log ρ =
| |v(X )| |22
2d +
(1 − α) | |v(A)| |2 | |v(X )| |2
d
− logZ . (11)
Because A is a given query, v(A) is a constant. Moreover, if we
assume that different related terms Xi have similar norms, (from (8)
it follows that such related terms must have similar frequencies of
occurrence in the corpus), then from (11) we see that there exists
a linear inverse relationship between log ρ and α . Because loga-
rithm function is monotonically increasing (11) implies an inverse
relationship between ρ and α .
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4.2 n = l > 1 case
Let us now extend the relationship given by (11) to the case where we
consider a document to be relevant if it can be retrieved from all of
the n related terms. In other words, we have l = n reconstructability
in this case. Because each search result is retrieved by all l terms,
we have
D ′(A) = ∩li=1D(Xi ). (12)
Reconstructability can be computed in this case as follows:
ρ =
p(A,X1,X2, . . . ,Xk )
p(A) = p(X1,X2, . . . ,Xl |A) ≈
l∏
i=1
p(Xi |A)
(13)
In (13) we have assumed that the related terms are mutually inde-
pendent given the query A.
Let us take the logarithm on both sides of (13), and use (7) and (8)
in the same manner as we did in Section 4.1 to derive the relationship
given by (14).
log ρ = 12d
l∑
i=1
| |v(Xi )| |22 +
1
d
l∑
i=1
v(A)⊤v(Xi ) − logZ (14)
In the n = l case, anonymity can be computed as follows:
α = 1 − 1
l
l∑
i=1
v(A)⊤v(Xi )
| |v(A)| |2 | |v(Xi )| |2
(15)
Let us further assume that all related terms X1,X2, . . . ,Xl occur
approximately the same number of times in the corpus. From (8) it
then follows that | |v(Xi )| |2 = c for i = 1, 2, . . . , l for some c ∈ R. By
plugging (15) in (14), and using the approximation | |v(Xi )| |2 = c
we arrive at the relationship between ρ, α , and l given by (16).
log ρ = cl2d (c + 2(1 − α) | |v(A)| |2) − logZ (16)
□
In the general case of l-reconstructability, we will have a subset of
l ≤ n related terms retrieving each document. The reconstructability
given by (16) must be considered as a lower-bound for this general
case because we will still be able to reconstruct the search results
using
(n
l
)
subsets of l related terms selected from a set of n related
terms.
5 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
To evaluate the proposed method we create a dataset where we select
50 popular queries from Wikipedia query logs and associate them
with the relevant Wikipedia articles. The 50 query terms used in
our experiments are as follows: airfield, alex, anthropology, antoine,
antony, autonomous, belfast, ben, benares, benet, benz, biodiversity,
broadway, carol, commercial, consciousness, crown, custer, earths,
elena, gallery, haddad, haig, helmut, hughes, hugo, irit, judith, kahn,
katarina, leith, marshal, masaaki, memorial, negro, oakley, outlaw,
product, rings, runaway, sammy, santa, sine, stawell, steve, toole,
tube, wait, wilkerson, angel.
We use December 2015 dump of English Wikipedia for this pur-
pose and build a keyword-based inverted search index. We use 300
dimensional pretrained GloVe [21] embeddings trained from a 42
billion token Web crawled corpus3 as the word embeddings for com-
puting relevant terms. Figures 3-5 show the anonymity and logarithm
of the reconstructability values for the 50 queries in our dataset at
three different levels of noise and different numbers of distractor
terms. Specifically, we add Gaussian noise with zero mean and stan-
dard deviations of 0.6 and 1.0 respectively to stimulate medium and
high levels of noise, whereas the no-noise case corresponds to not
perturbating the word embeddings.
We see a negative correlation between anonymity and recon-
structability in all plots as predicted by (16). Moreover, the absolute
value of the negative correlation increases with the noise level in
all cases with different numbers of distractor terms. Addition of
noise affects the selection of related terms. It does not affect the
selection of distractor terms. However, related terms influence both
anonymity as well as reconstructability. Because the Gaussian noise
is added to the word embedding of the original query, and the nearest
neighbours to this noise added embedding are selected as the related
terms, this process would help to increase anonymity. On the other
hand, the search results obtained using noisy related terms will be
less relevant to the original user query. Therefore, reconstructing
the search results for the original user query using the search results
for the noisy related terms will become more difficult, resulting
in decreasing the reconstructability. The overall effect of increas-
ing anonymity and decreasing reconstructability is shown by the
increased negative gradient of the line of best fit in the figures.
5.1 Robustness against Attacks
An important aspect of a query anonymisation method is how robust
it will be against attacks. Given that the proposed method sends two
groups of terms (relevant and distractor) to a search engine, a natural
line of attack will be for the search engine to cluster the received
terms to filter out distractor terms and then guess the user query from
the relevant terms. We call such attacks as clustering attacks in this
paper.
As a concrete example, we simulate a clustering attacker who
applies k-means clustering to the received terms. The similarity
between terms for the purpose of clustering is computed using the
cosine similarity between the corresponding word embeddings. Any
clustering algorithm can be used for this purpose. We use k-means
clustering because of its simplicity. Next, the attacker must identify
a single cluster that is likely to contain the relevant terms. For this
purpose, we measure the coherence, µ(C), of a cluster C given by
(17).
µ(C) = 2|C|(|C| − 1)
∑
u,v ∈C,u,v
sim(u,v) (17)
Here, u,v ∈ C are two distinct terms in C. Because a cluster contain-
ing relevant terms will be more coherent than a cluster containing
distractor terms, the attacker selects the cluster with the highest co-
herence as the relevant cluster. Finally, we find the term from the
entire vocabulary that is closest to the centroid of the cluster as the
guess Aˆ of the original user query A. We define hit rate to be the
proportion of the queries that we disclose via the clustering attack.
Figure 6 shows the hit rates for the clustering attacks under different
numbers of distractor terms.
3https://nlp.stanford.edu/projects/glove/
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Figure 3: Relationship between anonymity and reconstructability under different levels of added noise and no distractor terms (left:
no-noise, middle: medium-level of noise, and right: high-level of noise).
Figure 4: Relationship between anonymity and reconstructability under different levels of added noise and with 20 distractor terms
(left: no-noise, middle: medium-level of noise, and right: high-level of noise).
Figure 5: Relationship between anonymity and reconstructability under different levels of added noise and with 40 distractor terms
(left: no-noise, middle: medium-level of noise, and right: high-level of noise).
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Figure 6: Hit rates for the k-means clustering attacks for increasing number of clusters (k) and distractor terms. (left: no distractors,
middle: 20 distractors, and right: 40 distractors). In each figure, we show results for three levels of added noise.
From Figure 6 left we see that the hit rate is high when we do
not use any distractor terms. In this case, the set of candidate terms
consists purely of related terms Xi . We see that if we cluster all the
related terms into one cluster (k = 1) we can easily pick the original
query A by measuring the similarity to the centroid of the cluster.
The hit rate drops when we add noise to the word embeddings, but
even with the highest level of noise, we see that it is possible to
discover the original query in 19% of the time. However, the hit rate
drops significantly for all levels of noise when we add distractor
terms as shown in the middle and right plots in Figure 6. Further
results are presented in the SI. These results show the importance of
using distractor terms.
Hit rate is maximum when we set k = 2, which is an ideal choice
for the number of clusters considering the fact that we have two
groups of terms (related terms and distractors) among the candidates.
Increasing k also increases the possibility of further splitting the
related terms into multiple clusters thereby decreasing the probability
of discovering the original query from a single cluster. We see that
hit rates under no or medium levels of noise drops when we increase
the number of distractor terms from 20 to 40, but the effect on high-
level noise added candidates is less prominent. This result suggests
that we could increase the number of distractor terms while keeping
the level of noise to a minimum.
We show the related and distractor terms for two example queries,
Hitler, in Table 1 and mass murder, in Table 2. We see terms that are
related to the original queries can be accurately identified from the
word embeddings. Moreover, by adding a high-level of noise to the
embeddings, we can generate distractor terms that are sufficiently
further from the original queries. Consequently, we see that both
anonymity and reconstructability is relatively high for the examples.
Interestingly, the clustering attack is unable to discover the original
queries, irrespective of the number of clusters produced.
5.2 Trade-off between Reconstructability and the
Hit Rate in Clustering Attacks
If the keywords (related and distractor terms) sent to the search
engine are related to the original user query then the search engine
Query Hitler
noise high-level
related terms nazi, führer, gun, wehrmacht, guns, nra, pistol, bullets
distractors schenectady, fairfield, columbia, hanover, lafayette,
bronx, evansville, youngstown, tallahassee, alexandria,
northampton
anonymity 0.867
reconstructability 0.831
Clustering Attack Revealed Query
k=1 motagomery
k=2 albany, george
k=3 smith, albany
k=4 smith, fresno
k=5 rifle, albany
Table 1: Relevant and distractor terms for the query Hitler.
Both anonymity and reconstructrability is high for this query
with even with a small number of distractor terms. Clustering
attack with different number of clusters (k) does not reveal the
original query.
Query mass murder
noise high-level
related terms terrorism, killed, wrath, full-grown
distractors roselle, morristown, rockville, schenectady, utica, al-
bany, ashland, hartford, salem, columbus
anonymity 0.789
reconstructability 0.747
Clustering Attack Revealed Query
k=1 richmond
k=2 fremont, death
k=4 pasadena, words
k=4 pasadena, words
k=5 pasadena, anderson
Table 2: Relevant and distractor terms for the query mass mur-
der with 10 distractor terms. We see that the query or its two
tokens are not revealed by the clustering attacks with different
k values.
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will be able to return relevant search results that we can use to
reconstruct the search results for the original user query. However,
this will also increase the risk that the search engine can guess the
original user query using some attacking method such as k-means
clustering described in the paper. Hit rate was defined as the ratio of
the user queries correctly predicted by the clustering attack and is
a measure of the robustness of the proposed query anonymisation
method against k-means clustering attacks. Therefore, a natural
question is what is the relationship between the reconstructability
and the hit rate.
To empirically study the relationship between reconstructability
and hit rate, we conduct the following experiment. We randomly
select 109 user-queries and add Gaussian noise with zero-mean and
standard deviations 0 (no noise), 0.6, 1.0, 1.4 and 1.8. In each case,
we vary the number of distractor terms 0-120. We then apply k-
means clustering attacks with k values of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. In total,
for a fixed k-value and the number of distractor terms, we have 545
clustering attacks. To make the evaluation more conservative, in
this section we consider the terms in the vocabulary closest to the
respective centroids in all clusters and not only the most coherent
one as specified in Section 5.1. If the original query matches any of
those k terms, we consider it to be a hit. We randomly sample data
points from even intervals of reconstructability values and plot in
Figure 7.
We see a positive relationship between the reconstructability and
the hit rate in all figures. This indicates a trade-off between the
reconstructability and the hit rate, which shows that if we try to
increase the reconstructability by selecting more relevant keywords
to the original user-query, then it simultaneously increases the risk
of the search engine discovering the original user-query via a clus-
tering attack. Moreover, we see that when we increase the number
of distractor terms the hit rate drops for the same value of recon-
structability. This result shows that in order to overcome the trade
off between the reconstructability and the hit rate we can simply
increase the number of distractor terms, thereby making the query
anonymisation method more robust against clustering attacks. More-
over, the drop due to distractor terms is more prominent for the k = 1
attacks when we have distractor terms compared to that when we do
not have distractor terms. This is because both related and distractor
terms will be contained in this single cluster from which it is difficult
to guess the original user-query. Therefore, multiple clusters are
required for a successful k-means clustering attack.
Overall, the hit rate drops in the order of k = 5, k = 3 and k = 2
when we increase the number of distractor terms. This result suggests
that if one wants to increase the hit rate, then an effective strategy is
to increase the number of clusters because we consider it to be a hit
if the user-query is found via any of the clusters. Intuitively, if we
form more clusters and pick all terms form the vocabulary closest
to any one of the centroids, then the likelihood of predicting the
original user-query increases with the number of clusters formed.
However, in practice, we will need to further select one term from
all the clusters. Nevertheless, we can consider the hit rate obtained
in this manner to be a more conservative estimate, whereas in reality
it will be less and therefore be more robust against attacks.
6 HUMAN EVALUATION
The goal of our work was to anonymise queries sent to search engines
such that the search engine cannot guess the user’s information intent.
However, it is an interesting question whether a human, not a search
engine, could guess the original query from the set of related and
distractor terms suggested by the proposed method. This can be seen
as an upper baseline for anonymisation. To empirically evaluate the
difficulty for humans to predict the original query, we devise a query
prediction game, where a group of human subjects are required
to predict the original query from the related and distractor terms
suggested by the proposed method.
The query prediction game is conducted in two stages. In the
first stage, we randomly shuffle the related and distractor term sets
extracted by the proposed method for a hidden query. The human
subject is unaware of which of the terms are related to the original
user-query and which are distractors. A human subject has a single
guess to predict the user-query and wins only if the original query is
correctly predicted. If the human subject fails at this first step, then
we remove all distractor terms and display only the related terms to
the human subject. The human subject then has a second chance to
predict the original query from the related set of terms. If the human
subject correctly predicts the original query in the second stage, we
consider it to be a winning case. Otherwise, the current round of
the game is terminated and the next set of terms are shown to the
human subject. Winning rate is defined as the number of games won
by the human subjects, where the original user query was correctly
predicted.
Figures 8 and 9 show the winning rates for the first and second
stages of the query prediction game against the anonymity of the
queries. All queries selected for the prediction game have recon-
structability scores greater than 0.3, which indicates that the search
results for the original query can be accurately reconstructed from
the related and distractor terms shown to the human subjects. We
see that the winning rate for the first stage is lower than the second
stage, indicating that it is significantly easier for human subjects to
guess the original query when we have removed the distractor terms.
This result suggests that the distractor terms found by the proposed
method can distract not only search engines but also humans. From
Figure 9 we see that there is a gradual negative correlation between
hit rate and anonymity. This implies that more anonymous the terms
are, it becomes difficult for the human subjects to predict the origi-
nal query, which is a desirable property for a query anonymisation
method.
7 RELATED WORK
Our work is closely related to several different research fields such
as query anonymisation, user profile unlinking, user unidentifiability
and Private Information Retrieval (PIR). Traditionally, information
retrieval systems such as Web search engines have been primarily
text-based interfaces where users enter keywords that describe their
information need and the search engine returns relevant documents
to the users as the search results. The queries entered by the Web
search engine users often reveal intimate private information about
the users that they would not like to be known to the general public.
One of the early incidents of query logs leaking private information
in the public domain is the AOL’s release of query log data in
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Figure 7: Hit-rate shown against reconstructability for k-means attacks with left no distractor terms, middle 60 distractor terms and
right 120 distractor terms.
Figure 8: Winning rate vs. anonymity for the first-stage of the query prediction game
Figure 9: Winning rate vs. anonymity for the second-stage of the query prediction game
2006.4 AOL released 20 million search queries from over 600K
users, representing about 1.5% of AOL’s serch data from March,
April and May of 2006. The data contained the query, session id,
anonymised user id, and the rank and domain of the clicked result.
4https://tinyurl.com/y9qx9ufz
Despite the user ids being anonymised, various private information
about the users could be easily triangulated from the released queries,
which resulted after nine days AOL to issue an apology, remove
the website and terminate a number of employees responsible for
the decision, including the CTO. Following this incident various
methods have been proposed to anonymise user queries such as
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token-based hashing [12] and query-log bundling [11]. However, in
these approaches anonymisation happens only at the Web search
engine’s side without any intervention by the users, and the users
must trust the good intentions of the search engine with respect to
the user privacy. Moreover, [12] showed that hashing alone does not
guarantee user privacy.
Accessing Web search engines via an anonymised proxy server
such as the onion routing [7], TOR [6], Dissent [4] or RAC [17] is a
popular strategy employed by common users. The goal is to prevent
the search engine link the queries issues by a user to his or her user
profile. Unfortunately, hiding the IP address of a user alone does
not guarantee privacy as evident from the AOL incident in 2006,
which already had user IPs replaced by random ids in the released
query logs. In order to completely unlink their profiles, users must
continuously change the proxy servers used and clean caches in the
form of cookies and embedded javascript, which is a cumbersome
process.
A complementary approach for ensuring the unidentifiability of
users by the search engines is to issue a mixture of noisy or unrelated
keywords alongside the keywords that describe the information need
of the users. Several browser add-ons that automatically append un-
related fake terms have been developed such as TrackMetNot [10],
OptimiseGoogle, Google Privacy and Private Web Search tool [26].
Although this approach is similar to our proposal to append user
queries with distractor terms previously proposed methods have re-
lied on pre-compiled ontologies [23] such as the WordNet or queries
issued by other users shared via a peer network. Such approaches
have scalability issues because most named entities that appear in
search queries do not appear in the WordNet and it is unlikely that
users would openly share their keywords to be used by their peers.
The goal in Private Information Retrieval [29] is to retrieve data
from a database without revealing the query but only some encypted
or obfuscated version of it [3, 18]. For example, in hompmophic
encryption-based methods the user (client) submits encrypted key-
words and the search engine (server) performs a blinded lookup and
returns the results again in an encrypted form, which can then be
decrypted by the user. Embellishing queries with decoy terms fur-
ther protects the privacy of the users. However, unlike our proposed
method, PIR methods assume search engines to accommodate the
client side encryption methods, which is a critical limitation because
modern commercial Web search engines do not allow this.
Although we considered text-based queries, the proposed frame-
work is not limited to text-based information retrieval, but can be
easily extended to other types of search platforms. For example, in
the case of voice-based information retrieval [13], we can use the
spectrum of the voice input and add some noise to it such as white
noise to find the distractors. Likewise, in image-based information
retrieval, we can add noise to the image embedding produced by, for
example, a convolutional neural network-based filter [8, 14, 28]. We
plan to extend the proposed method to other types of information
retrieval tasks in the future.
8 CONCLUSION
We proposed a method to anonymise queries sent to a Web search
engine by decomposing the query into a set of related terms and a
set of distractor terms. We then reconstruct the search results for
the original query using the search results we obtain for the related
terms, discarding the search results for the distractor terms. We
theoretically studied the relationship between the anonymity and
the reconstructability obtained using the proposed method under
different noise levels. We empirically showed that the proposed
anonymisation method is robust against a k-means clustering attack.
Moreover, a human evaluation task, implemented as a query predic-
tion game, showed that it is even difficult for humans to predict the
original query from the anonymisation produced by the proposed
method.
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